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China remains the pre-eminent recipient of inward foreign direct investment (IFDI) among 
developing countries. FDI flows to the country continued to rise even during and after the 
recent global financial and economic crises, when many multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
found themselves in difficulties, demonstrating the continuing popularity of China as an 
investment destination. Nonetheless, other developing countries, such as Indonesia and 
Vietnam, are starting to steal China’s thunder, offering themselves as cheaper alternatives. 
Although FDI stock in China reached a new high of US$ 711 billion in 2011, IFDI attraction 
is losing its former high priority in the Government’s arsenal of economic policies, especially 
as the focus is turned ever more sharply on promoting outward investment. Now that 
domestic enterprises have taken over most of the functions provided by foreign investment in 
the first two decades of economic reform (i.e., the 1980s and 1990s), IFDI policies are being 
concentrated on honing the investment attraction effort to bring in foreign investments 
capable of filling gaps in the country’s industrial structure and helping China meet policy 
goals such as environmental protection and energy conservation. 
 
Trends and developments 
 
Country level developments1 
 
By 2011, China had accumulated an IFDI stock of US$ 711 billion, well ahead of such other 
large developing and transition economies as Brazil, with US$ 607 billion, India, with 
US$ 202 billion, and Russia, with US$ 457 billion (annex table 1).2  
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 The historical background and the longer-term development of inward FDI in China were analyzed in a 
previous Columbia FDI Profile (see Ken Davies, “Inward FDI in China and its policy context,” Columbia FDI 
Profiles (ISSN 2159-2268), October 18, 2010, available at: www.vcc.columbia.edu.) The present Profile is an 
update of that Profile and extends the analysis to developments with respect to IFDI in 2011. 
2 In 2005, China recalculated its FDI stock figures, which had hitherto been simple additions of annual flows, to 
bring them more in line with internationally recognized standards such as the OECD Benchmark Definition of 
FDI. The result was an approximate halving of the original estimate. Current figures are therefore understood to 
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In 2011, FDI inflows to China reached US$ 124 billion (annex table 2). From 2000 to 2011, 
China received larger FDI inflows than any other developing or transition economy.3 These 
flows reached US$ 108 billion in 2008; by comparison, 2008 IFDI flows to Brazil were 
US$ 45 billion, India US$ 43 billion and Russia US$ 75 billion (annex table 2). In 2009, 
China’s FDI inflows fell to US$ 95 billion as a result of the global economic crisis, then 
recovered strongly in 2010, when they reached US$ 115 billion and rose further to US$ 124 
billion in 2011, while India’s IFDI flows fell continuously since their peak in 2008 to US$ 24 
billion in 2010 before making a partial recovery to US$ 32 billion in 2011. Russian IFDI 
flows recovered from their 2009 plunge to US$ 43 billion in 2010 and US$ 53 billion in 2011, 
and Brazilian IFDI flows followed a similar recovery reaching US$ 49 billion in 2010 and 
US$ 59 billion in 2011 (annex table 2). The relatively good performance of China’s IFDI 
during both the Asian crisis of 1997-1998 and the recent global crises reflects international 
investor perceptions of China as a reliable risk-avoidance haven and even a potential 
locomotive of global growth in years to come, as it moves steadily toward becoming the 
world’s largest economy. 
 
Partly because of China’s World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments to a phased 
opening up of services to foreign participation during the five years following accession in 
December 2001, the share of the tertiary sector in total IFDI flows rose from 31% in 2001 to 
39% in 2010. At the same time, the share of the secondary sector declined from 66% to 58% 
and the always relatively tiny share of the primary sector shrank from 4% to under 3% (annex 
table 3). 
 
While IFDI in manufacturing rose from US$ 31 billion (utilized) in 2001 to US$ 1,400 billion 
(contractual value) in 2010, the sector’s share of total IFDI stock declined from 66% to 58% 
(annex table 3). The decline reflects a more rapid rise in IFDI in services, including, among 
others, financial services. Since 2002, foreigners can participate in China’s stock markets as 
qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs); as the qualifications required have become 
less strict, an increasing number of QFIIs have set up offices in China.4 Foreign banks have 
also expanded their operations as these have been increasingly allowed to conduct various 
banking services, including foreign currency services, for Chinese enterprises since 2002, 
Chinese yuan services since 2006 and credit card issuance since 2007. At the same time, 
while the burgeoning domestic market has continued to attract manufacturers, the increase in 
labor costs, more recently resulting from a wave of strikes in foreign affiliates, has prompted 
foreign investors to plan new investments in lower-cost economies such as Vietnam and 
Bangladesh.  
 
China’s IFDI is mainly sourced in Asian economies. As of 2010, 41% of China’s IFDI stock 
was from Hong Kong (China), 7% from Japan, 5% from Taiwan Province of China, 4% from 
the Republic of Korea, and 4% from Singapore. The British Virgin Islands provided 10%, 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
take account of disinvestments.  An explanation of the divergence of Chinese FDI statistics from internationally 
standard practices is in OECD, Investment Policy Reviews: China 2003 -- Progress and Reform Challenges 
(Paris: OECD, 2003). 
3  Based on statistics for all countries maintained in the UNCTAD FDI Statistical Database website 
UNCTADstat, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx, retrieved on May 31, 2012.  
4 According to the QFII list announced by the China Securities Regulatory Commission in February 2011, the 
number of QFIIs increased to 107 in China's capital market, and total QFII investment rose from US$ 4 billion 
in the pilot period of 2002 to US$ 30 billion in 2007. Cited from Wu Weihua, “Are qualified foreign 
institutional investors real investors or speculators: Evidence from China (May 10, 2011). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2056056 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2056056. 
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more than the United States and the European Union (EU) each of which supplied 7%; the 
major sources of EU FDI in China were the United Kingdom and Germany (each with just 
under 2% of total IFDI). The Cayman Islands supplied about the same proportion, 2%, as the 
United Kingdom (annex table 4). 
 
A major obstacle to providing an accurate account of the geographic distribution of China’s 
IFDI sources is the high proportion circuited through Hong Kong (China) and through 
Caribbean and other tax havens. Matching IFDI and OFDI figures for Hong Kong (China) 
suggest that much of those flows are passing through, from and to China, and include an 
element of round-tripping, 5  though it is also important to note that there is substantial 
investment from Hong Kong (China) in China’s burgeoning property sector and a good part 
of it is likely to be from domestic enterprises in Hong Kong. IFDI is concentrated in China’s 
eastern coastal regions, especially in Guangdong and Shanghai. Guangdong’s attractiveness 
as an FDI destination in the 1980s was mainly due to its light regulation, relative remoteness 
from the capital, Beijing (and therefore from central government control), its proximity to the 
region’s largest port, Hong Kong (China) that was seeking to shed its manufacturing sector, 
and the fact that it contained all but one of the country’s special economic zones (SEZs).6 
Shanghai, with its strong industrial base and its advantageous location as a major port at the 
mouth of the Yangtze, also drew large amounts of IFDI.  
 
A third major region, in the old industrial heartland of North-East coastal China, has also 
developed and is striving to attract FDI. Attempts to boost FDI in China’s less-developed 
interior, namely Central and West China, are continuing. 7  But while the physical 
infrastructure has been greatly improved and lower labor costs are making the hinterland 
more attractive as wage pressures mount in Guangdong, the developed coastal regions, with 
their more developed business environments and local markets, remain the largest recipients 
of IFDI.    
 
The corporate players 
 
Many Fortune Global 500 companies are present in China. The official list of the largest 
foreign affiliates by sales value in 2008 includes Nokia in second place and GM’s Shanghai 
affiliate in eighth place (annex table 5). The Foxconn Technology Group of Taiwan Province 
of China owns the largest foreign affiliate, Hongfujin Precision Industry. 
 
In 2008-2010 inbound merger and acquisition (M&A) deals have been spread across a 
diverse range of industries, including pharmaceuticals, natural gas transmission, copper 
mining, soybean milling, banking, semiconductors, frozen fruit and vegetables, industrial 
organic chemicals, beer and cement. Acquiring firms have come from all over the world 
                                                            
5
 “Round-tripping” refers here to the practice of Chinese investors setting up special purpose entities in 
territories outside China, including Hong Kong (China), which is treated as a source of foreign investment by 
the Chinese authorities, to invest in China and so benefit from fiscal incentives offered to foreign investors. 
Since it is often intended to deceive the authorities, round-tripping is impossible to estimate. The practice may 
be in decline as a result of the abolition of foreign investment incentives from 2008, and tighter reporting 
standards for special purpose entities established abroad by Chinese companies since 2006. For details, see 
OECD, Investment Policy Reviews: China 2008 – Encouraging Responsible Business Practice (Paris: OECD, 
2008). 
6 These factors are explained more fully by the author in OECD (2003), op. cit. 
7 For a fuller treatment of China’s regional FDI policy by the author, including the existing incentive policy and 
recommendations for further improvement, see OECD (2003), op. cit. 
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including Hong Kong, (China), Republic of Korea, Singapore, Canada and the United States. 
This wide sectoral and geographical dispersion illustrates the continuing openness of China to 
IFDI and its continuing popularity as an investment destination. Deal size, though, is not 
particularly large. The average transaction size of the top 16 deals in 2010 was US$ 570 
million, and for those in 2009 the average transaction value was US$ 881 million (annex 
table 6). Caution needs to be exercised in interpreting this information: the list includes 
Chinese companies like China Resources Gas Group Ltd. based in Hong Kong (China), 
which is one of the oldest companies to be established there by a mainland entity, and China 
Gold International Resources, via its Canadian affiliate.  
 
Recent large greenfield investments also show a tendency to focus on China’s domestic 
market. The domestic market has always been the main target of foreign investors  -- even in 
the early days of the 1980s when China wanted them to confine themselves to export 
manufacturing as it kept its domestic market closed. Current policy as stated in the 12th Five 
Year Plan is now the reverse: the economy is to be restructured to give more weight to the 
relatively underdeveloped domestic market and de-emphasize exports, and FDI is to play its 
part by focusing on China’s domestic market. Recent large greenfield investments aimed 
largely at the domestic market included automobiles and automobile components (by Daimler, 
Volkswagen, Yulon, Hyundai, BMW) (annex table 7), as China has become the world’s 
largest car market. 8  However, although the country’s cost base continues to rise by 
comparison with regional competitors, large investments in export manufacturing continue to 
be made. Recent examples include two greenfield investments in the chemicals sector by 
Chang Chun Group and Formosa Plastics, both from Taiwan Province of China. 
 
The list of greenfield investments by inward investing firms in 2008-2010 also contains one 
or two Chinese companies based in places like Hong Kong (China), like China Merchants 
Holding. As with M&As, greenfield investments are made in many sectors and by MNEs 
from many countries. In 2010, regional investors – from Japan, Republic of Korea, Hong 
Kong (China), Taiwan Province of China – were particularly active in greenfield investment 
in China. Average investment size is rather larger than for cross-border M&As: US$ 1.3 
billion in 2010 and US$ 1.5 billion in 2009. 
 
Effects of the recent global crisis 
 
As noted in the first Columbia FDI Profile on China’s IFDI9, China was less seriously 
affected by the global financial and economic crisis than were many other countries because 
of its relatively small exposure to the US sub-prime market and its highly effective – though 
not cost-free – counter-crisis stimulus package. After having fallen by 12% in 2009 (leaving it 
still well above the 2007 level), IFDI flows recovered in 2010, rising by  21% to US$ 115  
billion, above  the peak of US$ 108 billion recorded in 2008. There was an FDI inflow of 
US$ 124  billion in 2011, an increase of  8% over that of 2010. 
 
The policy scene 
 
                                                            
8 See, for example, “Factbox: China becomes the world's No.1 auto market,” Reuters, January 8, 2010, retrieved 
on June 6, 2012 from the Reuters website at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/08/us-auto-china-
idUSTRE60722O20100108. 
9 Davies, op. cit. 
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There has been no major change in the direction of China’s policies toward inward FDI 
during 2009-2010. The Government has continued to liberalize the FDI framework in 
incremental steps.10 In 2010, it raised the ceiling on provincial examination and approval 
authority over foreign investment projects in the “permitted” category of the Catalogue for 
the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries,11 from US$ 100 million to US$ 300 million. 
(The US$ 50 million ceiling on projects in the “restricted catalogue” remains unchanged.) In 
2011, examination and approval procedures were removed from the establishment of a 
branch, which is not subject to any special requirement.12  
 
There have been several decisions by MOFCOM in 2009-2011 on inbound (as well as on 
many domestic) M&A deals that were referred for merger control review under the 2008 
Anti-Monopoly Law, which brought domestic enterprises into the orbit of such reviews, 
effectively abolishing discrimination against foreign investors in this regard.13 Only one of 
these (Coca-Cola/Huiyuan) was rejected, but several others were allowed only with strong 
conditions. Although the Government’s actions are perceived as “aggressive” and the 
procedures are often dragged out to the maximum (i.e., a full 30 days for each of two 
successive reviews), they have not prevented major global MNEs from continuing to invest in 
China.  
 
In August 2011, China issued a set of detailed procedures for national security reviews of 
foreign acquisitions of domestic Chinese enterprises, effective September 1, 2011. The 
grounds for a review include the obvious one – that the enterprise to be acquired is in a 
military or military-related industry – but also the rather wider condition that the acquisition 
is in a category of industries classed as being related to “national economic security”, 
including major agricultural products, major energy and resources, infrastructure, transport, 
and key technologies. It does not appear at present that this will stop inward cross-border 
M&A deals that would otherwise have gone ahead. Instead, it may simply make the approval 
process more transparent, as decisions now have to be taken explicitly on national security 
grounds, and those decisions have to be explained. The procedures could, however, be 
operated in a more protectionist vein if a future administration decided to raise barriers 
against foreign investment. 
 
In December 2011, a further revision of the Catalogue for Guiding Foreign Investment 
Industries was promulgated, effective end-January 2012.14 This revision follows the revisions 
of 2001 – when the Catalogue was liberalized to comply with obligations entered into, when 
China acceded to the WTO in December 2001 – and 2004 and 2007. The latest Catalogue 
continues the trend of introducing more encouragement to FDI in “green” sub-sectors, while 
                                                            
10 These steps, detailed in the following sentences, can be found in detail on the MOFCOM FDI website at 
www.fdi.gov.cn. 
11 The Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries, promulgated by the State Council (China’s 
cabinet) has, from its inception in 1999, divided foreign investment projects into prohibited, restricted, permitted, 
and encouraged categories.  Lists of sectors included in each category are published, with the exception of the 
permitted category: sectors not listed in the three published categories are presumed to be open to foreign 
investment, unless they are closed or restricted by other regulations.  See OECD, Investment Policy Reviews: 
China -- Encouraging Responsible Business Conduct (Paris: OECD, 2008), and Davies, op. cit.    
12 All these measures are detailed in the forthcoming China Investment Policy Review Update 2012, to be 
published by the OECD. 
13 For details, see ibid. 
14 MOFCOM FDI website at www.fdi.gov.cn. 
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adjusting the incentives mix to current industrial needs, such as for example promoting 
higher-end manufacturing and new-generation IT.  
 
Full convertibility of the Chinese yuan (CNY or renminbi) is still far away. In the 1990s it 
was touted as a possibility by the end of the century, but this aim was thwarted by successive 
international economic crises, so the current goal of full convertibility in 2015 remains 
uncertain. Nevertheless, the Chinese Government is taking small steps toward it when it suits 
its trade and investment policies. A recent notice of the Ministry of Commerce allows foreign 
investors to invest with Chinese yuan obtained lawfully outside China. In practice, this means 
using the rapidly developing Chinese yuan market in Hong Kong (China), which is soon to be 
joined by a Chinese yuan market in the adjacent city of Shenzhen.  
 
In recent years, the Government has been trying to rein in the over-rapid growth of fixed 
investment as part of its efforts both to rebalance the economy in favor of private 
consumption and away from dependence on fixed investment as the main driver of economic 
growth and, especially since the remarkably successful stimulus program that followed the 
onset of the global economic crisis, to curb the runaway property market. This policy has 
coincided with a more selective approach to attracting FDI than was evident in the 1990s, 
when the emphasis was, in practice if not in theory, on maximizing the quantity of FDI. One 
result has been that the tightening of the real estate market during the first half of 2012 
brought about a 12.4% year-on-year decrease in utilized FDI in real estate, far greater than 




There are several reasons to expect growth in China’s FDI inflows to decelerate in 2012 and 
beyond, as has indeed been forecast by the Chinese Government itself.15 Economic problems 
in home countries are likely to slow, or even diminish, the supply of IFDI. There will 
probably be only sluggish economic growth in the United States and Japan, while the United 
Kingdom and several large Eurozone economies may well experience a recession in 2012. 
Some large MNEs in these countries are going through a tough period when they will be 
more concerned with profitability, or even survival, rather than overseas expansion.  
 
Extending the “jobless recovery” evident in those developed countries fortunate enough to be 
enjoying a recovery, many MNEs will continue to look abroad for cheaper labor, but they are 
decreasingly likely to find it in China. Wages have gone up markedly in China’s export 
powerhouse, Guangdong, and will doubtless do so elsewhere as investors respond by moving 
inland. Lower-wage countries like Indonesia and Vietnam are already starting to benefit – 
quite consciously and actively – from this shift.16  
 
Nevertheless, overall, China remains the most popular target for FDI among developing host 
countries. In the latest UNCTAD survey of MNEs, China ranked well above all the others in 
                                                            
15 For example, see Liu Yajun, director general of MOFCOM’s Department of Foreign Investment 
Administration, cited in China Daily, 6 January 2012. 
16 See, for example, the AT Kearney annual world investment prospects report entitled Cautious Investors Feed 
a Tentative Recovery on the AT Kearney website, retrieved on June 6, 2012 from 
http://www.atkearney.com/index.php/Publications/cautious-investors-feed-a-tentative-recovery.html; also 
Stephen Thomsen, Misuzu Otsuka and Boram Lee, The Evolving Role of Southeast Asia in Global FDI Flows 
(Paris: IFRI Center for Asian Studies, 2011). 
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the number of times it was mentioned as a top priority.17 Policy emphasis in China itself is 
switching toward promoting outward, rather than inward, investment, though national and 
sub-national investment promotion agencies will remain active in their efforts to encourage 
IFDI in activities considered important for China’s rapidly growing economy and its 
sustainable development. Since the second half of the 2000, it has been apparent that fixed 
investment growth in China is unsustainably high – often in real-terms double-digit 
percentage growth in recent years18  – and that fixed investment is an excessively large 
proportion of GDP.19  
 
The authorities have striven to rein in fixed investment growth and achieve a rebalancing of 
the economy toward domestic consumption, while also curbing the growth of the country’s 
absurdly high foreign exchange reserves (US$ 3.2 trillion at the end of June 2012.20 This 
environment is unlikely to encourage continued stress by policy-makers on pulling in foreign 
capital to prop up fixed investment, and focus is likely to shift to more specific objectives for 
attracting FDI. When the “open door” policy was initiated in the late 1970s, China did not 
have strong companies and export markets, let alone homegrown industries producing 
modern consumer goods, or a financial sector capable of financial intermediation. It does 
now. Many of the things that foreign companies needed to do can now be done by Chinese 
firms. Chinese corporations are now strong enough at home to be able to challenge foreign 
competitors, and they have their champions in the bureaucracy who consider foreign 
investment to be a malign influence.21 So far, suggestions that the Government use the new 
Anti-Monopoly Law and national security screening procedures to protect domestic 
competitors appear to have been rejected in favor of operating these instruments in a fairly 
transparent, if sometimes time-consuming, manner, but there will undoubtedly be pressure on 
them from the domestic corporate sector to be tougher on foreign investors. It is also less 
necessary to use IFDI  to attain global technological heights, as Chinese MNEs now have the 
money to undertake technology-gaining investments overseas, though they may still find it 
more convenient and quick to use IFDI for this purpose. Foreign-invested enterprises have 
consistently punched above their weight in creating millions of jobs in addition to the number 
of workers they employ directly. This is also something that Chinese companies can do, 
particularly the private sector SMEs, once they are let off the leash. 
 
The Chinese Government is, for the above reasons, now far less motivated to attract large 
quantities of FDI, and far more interested in improving the quality of FDI. As noted, the 
latest Catalogue for Guiding Foreign Investment Industries continues the trend of 
encouraging FDI in  “green” sub-sectors, while adjusting the incentives-mix to current 
industrial needs. While this shopping list is aspirational, it is also a clear indication that the 
                                                            
17 UNCTAD, World Investment Prospects Survey 2010-2012 (Geneva: United Nations, 2010). 
18 Real-terms GDP series data showing this double-digit growth of gross fixed investment can be found in the 
annual China Statistical Yearbook published by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, passim. 
19 For a contrarian view, which also restates the received wisdom and the widely cited statistics, see “Capital 
controversy: China’s “overinvestment” problem may be greatly overstated,” in The Economist, April 14, 2012. 
20 Information retrieved on June 6, 2012 from SAFE website at:  
http://www.safe.gov.cn/model_safe/tjsj/tjsj_detail.jsp?ID=110400000000000000,22&id=5, and on August 5, 
2012 from Chinability website at www.chinability.com/Reserves.htm. 
21 This attitude first surfaced at the 2006 session of the National People’s Congress, where the outgoing director 
of the National Bureau of Statistics, Li Deshui, warned that foreign companies were trying to monopolize the 
Chinese market, as reported by Xinhua (New China) News Agency on March 8, 2006, retrieved on June 6, 2012 
from http://www.china.org.cn/english/2006/Mar/160732.htm. It was strongly refuted by a MOFCOM director 
general at a conference in Beijing the following month, attended by the author. 
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Government is trying to move away from attracting labor-intensive, low technology 
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Economy 1990 2000 2010 2011 
China 21 193 579 711 
Memorandum: 
comparator economies 
Brazil 37 122 473 670 
Singapore 30 111 470 519 
Russia n.a. 32 423 457 
India 2 16 198 202 
 










Economy 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
China 41 47 53 54 61 72 73 84 108 95 115 124 
Memorandum: 
comparator economies 
Brazil 33 22 17 10 18 15 19 35 45 26 49 67 
Russia 3 3 4 8 15 13 30 55 75 37 43 53 
Singapore                   16 15 6 12 21 15 29 37 9 15 49 64 
India 4 5 6 4 6 8 20 25 43 36 24 32 
 
Source: UNCTAD's FDI/TNC database, available at: http://stats.unctad.org/fdi/.
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Annex table 3. China: distribution of inward FDI flows, by economic sector and industry, 2001 
and 2010 
 




Source: Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), China, available at: www.fdi.gov.cn.  
 
Note: The Chinese authorities include “utilities” and “construction” in the secondary sector, and the MOFCOM 
figures do not include all activities; so it is not possible to disaggregate and reconstruct the sectoral statistics 
entirely from their published tables. See the official definition of sectors from the annual statistical yearbook 
published by the National Bureau of Statistics. In China economic activities are categorized into the following 
three strata of industry: (1) “Primary industry” refers to agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery and 
services in support of these industries. (2) “Secondary industry” refers to mining and quarrying, manufacturing, 
production and supply of electricity, water and gas, and construction. (3)”Tertiary industry” refers to all other 
economic activities not included in the primary or secondary industries. 
 
a Utilized investment.  
b Contractual value of investment.











































Annex table 4. China: geographical distribution of inward  FDI stock,a 2002 and 2010 
 
(US$ billion)  
Region/economy 2002 2010 
World 448.0 1,107.8 
Developed economies n.a. n.a. 
  Europe n.a. n.a. 
    European Union 33.9 72.1 
      Belgium 0.6 1.1 
      Denmark 0.5 2.0 
      France 5.5 10.8 
      Germany 8.0 17.2 
      Italy 2.2 5.1 
      Netherlands 4.3 10.9 
      Spain 0.4 2.0 
      Sweden 0.8 2.1 
      United Kingdom 10.7 17.1 
North America 43.2 73.1 
    Canada 3.4 7.9 
    United States 39.9 78.7 
Other developed economies n.a. n.a. 
    Australia n.a. n.a. 
    Japan 36.3 73.6 
Developing economies n.a. n.a. 
    Africa n.a. n.a. 
      Mauritius n.a. 9.4 
Asia n.a. n.a. 
Hong Kong (China) 204.9 456.2 
Macau (China) 4.8 9.7 
Indonesia 1.1 2.1 
Korea, Republic of 15.2 47.3 
Malaysia 2.8 5.7 
Philippines 1.4 2.8 
Singapore 21.5 46.9 
Taiwan Province of China 33.1 52.0 
Thailand 2.4 3.3 
Western Samoa 2.3 16.1 
Latin America and Caribbean n.a. n.a. 
Barbados n.a. 3.6 
British Virgin Islands 24.4 111.8 
Cayman Islands 3.8 21.6 
Unidentified others n.a. 100.7 
 
Source: Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), China, available at: www.fdi.gov.cn.  
a The above  statistics, released by MOFCOM for purposes of geographical breakdown,  represent cumulated 
FDI. As they do not include divestments, total IFDI stock in this table is much larger than the IFDI stock total in 
annex table 1, which comes closer to internationally-recognized standards of FDI measurement (see footnote 2 





Annex table 5. China: principal foreign affiliates in economy, ranked by value of sales, 
2008 
 
Rank Name of affiliate Industry Sales 
(US$ million) 
1 Hongfujin Precision Industry (Shenzhen) Co. Ltd. Computer peripherals            26,974 
2 Nokia Telecommunication Co. Ltd. Cell phones            13,767  
3 China Offshore Petroleum (China) Limited Oil and gas            11,354 
4 Dagong (Shanghai) Computer Co. Ltd. Computers            10,535  
5 Fay-Volkswagen Sales Co. Ltd. Automobile            10,412  
6 Daofeng (Shanghai) Computer Co. Ltd. Computers              9,471  
7 Angang Steel Ltd. Steel              9,424 
8 Shanghai GM Automobile Co. Ltd. Automobile              9,366  
9 Fay-Volkswagen Co. Ltd. Automobile              9,217  
10 Motorola (China) Electronic Ltd. Telecom equipment              8,099  
11 Maanshan Steel Co. Ltd. Steel              7,287  
12 Huaneng International Power Co. Ltd. Electricity generation              7,257  
13 Shanghai Volkswagen Automotive Sale Ltd. Automobile              7,233  
14 Dongfeng Toyota Auto Sale Co. Ltd. Automobile              7,145 
15 Dongfeng Auto Company Automobile              7,057  
16 Air China Co. Ltd. Airline              6,767  
17 Shanghai Volkswagen Automotive Ltd. Automobile              6,734  
18 Yingshunda Science & Technology Co. Ltd. Consumer electronics              6,430 
19 Nokia (China) Investment Co. Ltd. Cell phones 6,393 
20 China Southern Airlines Co. Ltd. Airlines 6,350 
 

























2010 BBVA Spain China CITIC Bank 
Corp. Ltd. 
Banking 4.9 1,652.4 




Tianjin Port Co. Ltd. Transportation 
services 
56.8 1,483.0 
2010 China Gold 
International 
Resources Ltd. 

















2010 Cardinal Health 
Inc 








































Bank of Jilin Co. 
Ltd. 








Malt beverages 12.3 349.1 













Mega Fair Ltd. Natural gas 
transmission 
100.0 271.7 




China Huiyuan Juice 
Group Ltd. 
Frozen fruits, 
fruit juices and 
vegetables 
23.0 260.7 








GCL Solar Energy 
Tech Hldg Inc 
Semiconductors 100.0 3,787.5 
2009 BBVA Spain China Citic Bank Banking 4.9 1,601.6 







2009 Investor Group Hong Kong, 
China 















2009 MAN Finance 
& Holding Sarl 










China Jin Mao 














Japan Tsingtao Brewery 
Co. Ltd. 




United States Pypo Digital Co Ltd Electronic 
equipment 
100.0 378.0 
2009 CRH PLC Ireland Jilin Yatai Grp 
Cement Invest 
Investors 26.0 296.7 














& Media Inc 





2009 ADF Phoenix 
IV Ltd 













2008 Bank of 
America Corp. 
United States China Construction 
Bank Corp 
Banking 8.4 7,067.4 
2008 Bank of 
America Corp 
United States China Construction 
Bank Corp 
Banking 2.6 1,860.5 


















2008 Deutsche Bank 
AG 
Germany Huaxia Bank Co. 
Ltd. 
Banking 5.3 552.9 
2008 Songzai Intl 
Holding Group 
Inc. 
United States Heilongjiang Xing 
An Group Hong 
Bituminous 
coal and lignite 
surface mining 
90.0 550.0 
2008 BP Overseas 
Development 
Co Ltd 
Thailand Asian American 
Coal Inc 
Bituminous 
coal and lignite 
surface mining 
78.4 432.8 
2008 Beiersdorf AG Germany C-BONS Hair Care Cosmetics 85.0 381.4 
2008 Johnson & 
Johnson 
United States Beijing Dabao 




2008 Holcim Ltd Switzerland Huaxin Cement Co. 
Ltd. 
Cement 18.6 282.7 
2008 Hong Leong 
Bank Bhd. 
Malaysia Chengdu City 
Commercial Bank 
Banking 20.0 261.0 
























2008 Investor Group France Chongqing Water 
Group Co. Ltd. 
Water supply n.a. 220.0 
 





Annex table 7. China: main greenfield projects, by inward investing firm, 2008-2010 
 




2010 AU Optronics Taiwan (Province of China) Electronic components 3.0 
2010 Chang Chun Group Taiwan (Province of China) Chemicals 2.4 
2010 Formosa Plastics Group 
(FPG) 
Taiwan (Province of China) Chemicals 2.3 
2010 Wintek Taiwan (Province of China) Electronic components 1.7 
2010 Meydan City Corporation United Arab Emirates Real estate 1.6 
2010 Standard Chartered Bank United Kingdom Financial services 1.5 
2010 Enersys United States Electronic components 1.2 
2010 Hankook Tire Korea (Rep. of) Rubber 1.0 
2010 Corning United States Ceramics and glass 0.8 
2010 Nokia Siemens Networks Finland Communications 0.8 
2010 SK Group Korea (Rep. of) Coal, oil and natural gas 0.8 
2010 Tesco United Kingdom Food and tobacco 0.8 
2010 Nissan Japan Automotive OEM 0.7 
2010 Nomura Holdings Japan Financial Services 0.7 
2010 Sunbase International Hong Kong, (China) Electronic components 0.7 
2009 Chevron Corporation United States Coal, oil and natural gas 4.7 
2009 LG Korea (Rep. of) Electronic components 4.0 
2009 Samsung   Korea (Rep. of) Electronic components 2.2 
2009 Charoen Pokphand Group Thailand Food and tobacco 1.2 
2009 China Merchants Holdings 
(International) 
Hong Kong (China) Warehousing and storage 1.2 
2009 Shimao Property Holdings 
Ltd. 
Hong Kong (China) Real estate 1.2 
2009 Cheng Shin Rubber Industry Taiwan (Province of 
China) 
Rubber  1.0 
2009 Hon Hai Precision Industry Taiwan (Province of 
China) 
Electronic components 1.0 
2009 Hon Hai Precision Industry Taiwan (Province of 
China) 
Electronic components 1.0 
2009 Michelin France Rubber  1.0 
2009 Novartis Switzerland Biotechnology 1.0 
2009 Chevron Corporation United States Coal, oil and natural gas    0.8 
2009 Daiwa House Industry Japan Real estate   0.8 
2009 Jumbo Lane Investments United Kingdom Coal, oil and natural gas   0.8 
2009 Royal Dutch Shell Netherlands Coal, oil and natural gas    0.8  
2008 Daimler AG Germany Automotive OEM 0.9 
2008 ROSM France Consumer products 2.0 
2008 Royal Vopak Netherlands Warehousing and storage 1.0 
2008 Howard Group 
Development 
Hong Kong (China) Transportation 1.5 
2008 Walt Disney United States Leisure and entertainment 3.6 
2008 SK Energy Korea (Rep. of) Chemicals 2.0 
2008 Henderson Hong Kong (China) Real estate 1.4 
2008 Lotte Group Korea (Rep. of) Real estate 1.0 
2008 Volkswagen Germany Automotive OEM 0.9 
2008 Electric Power 
Development (J-Power) 
Japan Coal, oil and natural gas 0.7 
2008 Yulon Motor Taiwan (Province of 
China) 
Automotive OEM 0.7 
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2008 Hyundai Motor Korea (Rep. of) Automotive OEM 0.8 
2008 Compal Electronics Taiwan (Province of 
China) 
Business machines and 
equipment 
0.7 
2008 Saudi Basic Industries 
(SABIC) 
Saudi Arabia Chemicals 1.7 
2008 Israel Corp (IC) Israel Automotive OEM 0.8 
 
Source: The author, based on fDi Intelligence, a service from the Financial Times Ltd. 
